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site to holding public office was unconstitutional.40 In view of these deci-
sions, the Court's silence regarding constitutionality can only be inter-
preted as a contemporary mandate directing lower courts not to become
involved with the constitutionality of section 6(j). Yet, the doctrine that
"neither [state nor federal government] can aid these religions based on a
belief in the existence of God as against . . . religions founded on different
beliefs,"'" when applied to section 6(j), implicates the unconstitutionality
of the conscientious objector provision.42
The repetitious silence of the Stolberg court, in light of the fact that it
too had the constitutional issue directly before it,43 indicates a strict ad-
herence to the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the judicial attitude to
recognize the "time honored principle of construing a statute not only to
escape unconstitutionality but to avoid grave and doubtful constitutional
questions. '44
In conclusion, it can be said of the Stolberg case that it is a vehicle by
which lawyer, jurist and litigant may evaluate current, judicial tempera-
ment in regard to the granting of the conscientious objector exemption.
Inasmuch as it is a first reaction to the Supreme Court mandate of effects
of its compliance with that edict are not conclusive. However, in view of
recent case holdings, contemporary social climate, and the unwillingness
of the Supreme Court to declare the constitutional issue regarding section
6(j) ripe for decision, it is most probable that the adherence demonstrated
by Stolberg is indeed the initiation of a modern trend of conformity to the
holding of the Supreme Court in the Seeger case.
Robert Sulnick
40 Ibid. 41 Id. at 492.
42 The doctrine has been successfully applied in School District of Abington Town-
ship, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 230 (1963); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Zorach v. Caluson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). See also,
Conklin, supra note 15.
43 Brief for Appellant, p. 4, United States v. Stolberg, supra note 2. Petitioner argued
that section 6(j) is repugnant to both the first and fifth amendments of the Constitution.
44 United States v. Jakobson, supra note 8 at 415.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-LEGITIMACY OF OFFSPRING-
PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE SUBSEQUENT TO
MERETRICIOUS RELATIONSHIP
The plaintiff's husband died intestate survived by the plaintiff and two
children of a former marriage. Sixteen days prior to his marriage to the
plaintiff, the decedent had executed a trust agreement leaving his entire
estate to his children. The plaintiff commenced an action to set aside the
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trust agreement as a fraud on her marital rights, and to seek the full share
of the decedent's estate based upon her contention that the children were
illegitimate,' and thus not entitled to share in the distribution 2 thereof. The
trial court found that the decedent did not defraud the plaintiff of her
marital rights and the children were the legitimate issue of the decedent.
The Illinois Appellate Court reversed in part by setting aside the trust
agreement, but held the children to be legitimate and fully entitled to their
intestate shares. The court stated that written evidence or documentary
proof was not necessary to prove the validity of the prior marriage since
the parties' statements that they were a married couple with cohabitation
permitted a reasonable presumption that they were married. Stathos v.
LaSalle National Bank, 62 111. App. 2d 398, 210 N.E.2d 828 (1965).
The plaintiff's claim of illegitimacy was predicated upon her contention
that no presumption of legitimacy attaches to children who are the prod-
uct of a relationship of meretricious origin in the absence of proof that
such relationship has been superseded by an actual marriage. The court
rejected the plaintiff's contentions and held that proof of cohabitation and
reputation3 is sufficient to sustain a marriage where the legitimacy of chil-
dren is at issue. In analyzing this problem, this note will examine two basic
factors in the court's decision. It will consider the weight which courts
have given the presumption of legitimacy in sustaining marriages of an il-
licit origin and secondly, the amount of proof which will rebut the pre-
sumption of a continuance of an illicit relationship.
Basic to any discussion of the subject is the understanding that marriage
is a civil contract 4 by which man and woman agree to take each other for
1 The evidence showed that at the time the eldest child was conceived, the decedent
was cohabitating with the child's mother but was still married to his first wife. An
illicit relationship is one in which one of the parties has a spouse by a former marriage,
living and undivorced. Cole v. Cole, 153 Ill. 585, 38 N.E. 703 (1894).
2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 11 (1965): "First, when there is a surviving spouse and also
a descendant of the decedent: one-third of the personal estate and one-third of each
parcel of real estate to the surviving spouse and the remaining two-thirds to the dece-
dent's descendants per stirpes,... Third, when there is a surviving spouse but no de-
scendant of the decedent: the entire estate to the surviving spouse ......
3 Reputation imports recognition by the public that two people do appear in fact
as having the legal status of husband and wife. See Graham v. Graham, 130 Colo. 225,
274 P.2d 605 (1954).
4 "It is also to be observed that, whilst marriage is often termed by text writers and in
decisions of courts as a civil contract .... it is something more than a mere contract.
The consent of the parties is of course essential to its existence, but when the contract to
marry is executed by the marriage, a relation between the parties is created which they
cannot change. Other contracts may be modified, restricted, or enlarged, or entirely
released upon the consent of the parties. Not so with marriage. The relation once
formed, the law steps in and holds the parties to various obligations and liabilities."
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210 (1888).
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husband and wife during their joint lives, unless terminated by law.5 A
common-law marriage is one entered into by mutual agreement and re-
quires no ceremony. 6 The requisites are an actual and present agreement
to enter into a matrimonial relation followed by cohabitation. 7 To prove a
common-law marriage, it is not necessary to prove the contract itself, but it
is sufficient if the facts of the case are such as to warrant the inference that
such a contract has taken place." An agreement of marriage per verba de
preasenti, followed by cohabitation is strengthened by the fact that both
parties had the capacity to marry and that no illicit relation had existed
between the parties. 9
Prior to 1905, common-law marriages were recognized in Illinois, 10 but
they were subsequently declared null and void. 1 Today, the common-law
marriage is recognized in only a minority of jurisdictions.12 The reasons
given by the majority of states for prohibiting common-law marriages is
founded upon the many abuses arising from such. Their effect on public
morality, private property rights, and the legitimacy of children called for
their invalidation.' 3
In view of the importance of marriage as a social institution and the ben-
efits accruing therefrom, it is favored by public policy and the law.14 It
follows that a marriage will, if possible, be upheld as valid, and the validity
will be presumed unless disproved. 15 The fact that a man and a woman
have openly cohabited as husband and wife for a considerable length of
time may give rise to a presumption that they had previously entered into
an actual marriage, although there is no documentary evidence or direct
5 Seuss v. Schukat, 358 II1. 27, 192 N.E. 668 (1934).
6 McKenna v. McKenna, 180 111. 577, 54 N.E. 641 (1899).
7 Rittgers v. U.S., 154 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1946); Herald v. Moker, 257 III. 27, 100 N.E.
277 (1912); Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 196 111. 432, 63 N.E. 1023 (1902); In re Mandel's
Estate, 108 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1949); Dibble v. Dibble, 88 Ohio App. 490, 100 N.E.2d 451
(1950).
8 Davis v. Tickell, 230 I11. App. 285 (1923).
9 Heymann v. Heymann, 218 111. 636, 75 N.E. 1079 (1905).
10 Young v. Young, 213 111. App. 402 (1918).
11 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 89, § 4 (1965).
12 Those states still allowing common-law marriages include: Alabama, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, and Texas.
13 Dacunzo v. Edgye, 19 N.J. 443, 117 A.2d 508 (1955); Lesher v. Lesher, 159 II. App.
432 (1911).
14 Sanders v. Sanders, 52 Ariz. 156, 79 P.2d 523 (1938).
15 Matthes v. Matthes, 198 I11. App. 515 (1916). Accord, Reed v. Reed, 202 Ga. 508,
43 S.E.2d 539 (1947); Springer v. Springer, 75 N.YS2d 471 (1947); Tyson v. Weather-
ly, 214 S.C. 336, 52 SE,2d 410 (1949),
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testimony to that effect.16 The strength of the presumption increases with
the birth of children, and the fact that the legitimacy of a child may be
involved is a factor in sustaining the marriage.1 7 How strongly courts feel
in the matter of legitimacy is illustrated in the words of the Illinois Su-
preme Court:
The law presumes that every child in a christian country is prima facie the
offspring of a lawful . . . union of the parents, . . . The law is unwilling to
bastardize children, and throws the proof on the party who alleges illegitimacy,
and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a child . . . is therefore a
legitimate child. The presumption and charity of the law are in his favor and
those who wish to bastardize him must make out the fact by clear and irre-
fragible proof.18
Thus, in the normal case, when children claim to be the legitimate heirs in
a questionable marriage, the presumption of legitimacy and a valid mar-
riage are in their favor and the burden of proof is upon the party seeking
to disprove the marriage. 19
It should be recognized, however, that these presumptions are rebuttable
rather than conclusive.20 If intercourse between the parties was illicit in its
inception because of their failure or disability to enter into marriage by
ceremony or by agreement, it is presumed to continue so;21 and the mere
factor of cohabitation will not give rise to the presumption of marriage.22
If a relationship illicit in its inception is shown, it becomes incumbent upon
the party claiming rights under the marriage to prove the validity of that
marriage .23
The Illinois Supreme Court has had several opportunities to consider this
16 A marriage may be presumed from cohabitation and reputation, Myatt v. Myatt,
44 111.473 (1867); In re Lamond's Estate, 68 N.Y.S.2d 690 (1947); Highland v. Highland,
159 Pa. Super, 633, 49 A.2d 529 (1946).
17 In re Rosenberger's Estate, 362 Pa. 153, 65 A.2d 377 (1949); Tarleton v. Thompson,
125 S.C. 182, 118 S.E. 421 (1923); Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n. v. Elder, 155 Tex. 27, 282
S.W.2d 371 (1955).
18 Orthwein v. Thomas, 127 IIl. 554, 562, 21 N.E. 430, 432 (1889). See also, Arndt v.
Arndt, 336 111. App. 65, 82 N.E.2d 908 (1948); Raymond v. Lowe, 327 Ill. App. 614,
65 N.E.2d 35 (1946).
19 In re Kritsch's Estate, 342 Ill. App. 452, 96 N.E.2d 846 (1951).
20 Marks v. Marks, 108 I11. App. 371 (1903); De Rosay v. De Rosay, 162 Pa. Super.
333, 57 A.2d 685 (1948); Jordan v. Mohan, 15 N.J. Super. 513, 83 A.2d 614 (1951);
In re O'Neil's Estate, 64 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1946).
21 Gorden v. Gorden, 283 Ill. 182, 119 N.E. 312 (1918); Bolkovac v. State, 229 Ind. 294,
98 N.E.2d 250 (1951); Pierce v. Pierce, 355 Pa. 175, 49 A.2d 346 (1946).
22 Supra note 20. See also Bellinger v. Devine, 269 Ill. 72, 109 N.E. 666 (1915).
23 Hendrich v. Anderson, 191 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1951); Gorden v. Gorden, 283 111.
182, 119 N.E. 312 (1918); In re Dittman's Estate, 124 Ind. App. 198, 115 N.E.2d 125
(1953).
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question since common-law marriages were abolished by statute.24 In Illi-
nois Steel Co. v. Industrial Commission,2 where cohabitation was begun
in 1901, the plaintiff petitioned for compensation from the decedent's death
on behalf of an applicant who claimed that she was the decedent's wife.
Though the legitimacy of children was not in question, the court held that
cohabitation illicit in its inception will be presumed to continue so, reason-
ing that a party asserting the marriage has the burden of proof to show
not only that the illegal relation has terminated, but also that it was termi-
nated through a mutual agreement by the parties.
In Gorden v. Gorden,26 where both parties to a meretricious relationship
begun prior to the abolition of common-law marriages had since died, the
plaintiff sought to set aside the will of his deceased father contending that
he was the only son and heir of the decedent. Even though legitimacy was
in issue, the court said:
The presumption of marriage arising from cohabitation and repute is rebut-
table; and, where it is shown that the cohabitation began meretriciously, the
burden is upon the person claiming the marriage to show it, independently of
the presumption.27
Thus, the Illinois cases have held that a relation illicit in its inception
will be presumed to continue to be illicit, and the burden of proving a sub-
sequent change to marital status rests upon the party asserting it.28 This
change, however, is not shown by a reputation of marriage, since marital
representations are the ordinary means for concealing an improper rela-
tionship.29 Therefore, without documentary proof or testimony of a sub-
sequent actual marriage, marriage will not be presumed valid from contin-
ued cohabitation and reputation of the relationship which was of an illicit
origin.
Turning now to the case, at bar,80 it is clear that the Stathos case is dis-
tinguished from the holdings discussed above. In all previous cases, the
Illinois courts were asked to sustain marriages begun prior to the abolition
of common-law marriages in Illinois. The illicit relationship in each case
was begun prior to 1905. In the present case, the meretricious relationship
between the decedent and his alleged wife began in 1945, long after
common-law marriage had been abolished in Illinois. The evidence in this
24 Supra notes 10 and 11. 26 283 I1. 182, 119 N.E. 312 (1918).
25 290 I11. 594, 125 N.E. 252 (1919). 27 Id. at 194, 119 N.E. at 317.
28 As to a meretricious relationship with its origin in 1898, see Sebree v. Sebree, 293
I11. 228, 127 N.E. 392 (1920).
2 9 In Stearns v. Stearns, 376 I11. 283, 33 N.E.2d 481 (1941), the relationship had its
illicit origin in 1882. See also Cartwright v. McGown, 121 I11. 388, 12 N.E. 737 (1887).
8 0 Stathos v. LaSalle National Bank, 62 Ill. App. 2d 398, 210 N.E.2d 828 (1965).
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case already shows that the relationship between the decedent and the de-
fendant's mother had an illicit origin.3 1 Under the holdings previously
cited, it was undisputed that during the era of common-law marriages,
positive proofs were required to take an original meretricious union and
demonstrate it had achieved such fruition as to remove any stigma which
had originally attached. In the instant case, though no such evidence was
introduced, the fact that the legitimacy of children was in issue seems to
have induced the Illinois Appellate Court into holding cohabitation and
reputation to be sufficient.
The presumption of the legitimacy of children is one of the strongest
presumptions known to the law. 2 Basically, the law's refusal to bastardize
children may be attributed to three factors: the stigma of illegitimacy
which causes environmental changes that have physical and psychological
effects on an individual; a hesitancy to exonerate the husband because the
child might become a financial burden upon the state; and a reluctance to
disturb what has been termed to be sacred integrity of the family unit.33
It is understandable then, that when courts are asked to determine the
validity of a marriage which arose out of a relationship which was illicit at
its inception, they properly consider that refusal to recognize such a mar-
riage would in effect bastardize the children. Thus, the factor of legitimacy
is a primary consideration of the court in ruling upon the validity of a
marriage, whether it be of the common-law or ceremonial variety. This was
certainly controlling in the case of In re Rosenberger's Estate,3 4 wherein
the court was duly impressed with the fact that failure to recognize the
common-law marriage of the decedent would result in the bastardization
of a child. In the Succession of Gaines,35 the court was confronted with
contradictory testimony of whether or not a ceremonial marriage had
taken place. In sustaining the marriage, the court reiterated the strength of
the presumptions in favor of marriage and the legitimacy of children.3 6
The fact that the presumption of legitimacy was a controlling factor in
the case at bar is questionable. In sustaining the children's legitimacy, the
court said:
31 Supra note 1.
32 Bowers v. Bailey, 237 Iowa 295, 21 N.W.2d 773 (1946); In re Rowe's Estate, 172 Or.
293, 141 P.2d 832 (1943); Dirion v. Brewer, 20 Ohio App. 298. 151 N.E. 818 (1925);
In re Stanton, 123 N.Y.S. 458 (1910); People v. Powers, 340 I11. App. 201, 91 N.E.2d 637
(1950); Commonwealth v. Moska, 107 Pa. Super. 72, 162 A. 343 (1932).
33 35 So. CAL. L. REV. 437 (1962). In Illinois an illegitimate child may be legitimized
if his parents later marry and he is acknowledged by the father as his child. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1965).
34 In re Rosenberger's Estate, supra note 17.
35 227 La. 318, 79 So.2d 322 (1955). 86 Id. at 323, 79 So.2d. at 324
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The appellant argues that the proof shows that the relationship of the children's
parents began illicitly and states that this overcomes the presumption of legiti-
macy of children. She urges on this court a rule which would require the
children to produce some documentary proof of a wedding or a witness thereto
in order to establish their legitimacy .... No one knows where the marriage
took place, and it would be impossible for the appellees to check the records
of every person authorized to perform marriages in the Midwest. While the
appellee's proof is not the most convincing, we feel that when a man and
woman say they are married and live together as man and wife until death
parts them, there is a reasonable presumption that they in fact are married.3 7
While documentary proof or testimony was necessary to overcome the
presumption of a continuation of an illicit relationship begun in the
common-law era, the Illinois Appellate Court has held that it may be over-
come by proof of cohabitation and reputation, even though proof of such
is not the most convincing. This holding, however, is limited to the factual
situation where both parties to the alleged marriage are deceased. 8 In re-
laxing the standards previously imposed, the court was clearly influenced
by the presumption of validity of a ceremonial marriage, as opposed to a
common-law marriage, and the strong presumption of the legitimacy of
children.
Herbert Hoffman
37 Supra note 30 at 407, 210 N.E.2d at 832.
38 Id. at 408, 210 N.E.2d at 833. "If one of the parties to this marriage were still alive,
we might hold differently and rule that some documentary evidence would be nec-
essary. In such case, it would be reasonable to assume that a party to a marriage would
remember where the ceremony took place. .. "
EVIDENCE-EXPERT WITNESS-USE OF AUTHORITATIVE
TREATISES ON CROSS-EXAMINATION
Plaintiff entered defendant's hospital for treatment of a broken leg and
was treated by a doctor who, with the assistance of hospital personnel,
placed plaintiff's leg in a cast. Subsequently, the leg became infected, re-
quiring partial amputation, and plaintiff brought suit, alleging improper
care and treatment on the part of the doctor and the hospital. At trial,
defendant's expert medical witnesses stated on direct examination that
their opinions were based on their general experience and training. Plain-
tiff's counsel was permitted, over defendant's objection, to cross-examine
them as to relevant extracts from standard authorities. The appellate
court' affirmed the judgment for plaintiff and held that the strict reliance
rule2 espoused by earlier Illinois cases be expanded to allow the use on
1 Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 50 111. App. 2d 253, 200
N.E.2d 149 (1964).
2 "The law is well settled in this State that scientific books may not be admitted in
evidence before a jury, and that such books cannot be read from to contradict an expert
